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I. INTRODUCTION
One theme of this symposium, which celebrates the 100th anni-
versary of the federal income tax, is "The Next 100 Years." What will
the next hundred years have in store for the federal income tax? We
suspect that technological innovations will play a very significant
role. Technology has dramatically affected life in the United States
over the past century in many areas, perhaps most notably in com-
munications.' On the other hand, the income tax is technologically
very similar to the way it was in its early years, and technological
developments have been at the margins of the income tax and have
not affected its core elements.
This is not to imply that technology has had no effect on the in-
come tax. Technological improvements have made third-party report-
ing and withholding more efficient, which has allowed these mecha-
nisms to become more pervasively used. 2 Tax compliance software
has made it easier for professional tax preparers and taxpayers alike
to prepare and file tax returns and information statements.' Tech-
nology has also made it easier for taxpayers to substantiate their ac-
tivities; the proverbial shoebox full of receipts is disappearing. All of
these changes have undoubtedly facilitated the evolution of the in-
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1. Wesley MacNeil Oliver, Western Union, the American Federation of Labor, Google,
and the Changing Face of Privacy Advocates, 81 MIsS. L.J. 971, 972 (2012).
2. Ruth Mason, Delegating Up: State Conformity with the Federal Tax Base, 62
DUKE L.J. 1267, 1280-81 (2013).
3. See id.; see also Jay A. Soled, Homage to Information Returns, 27 VA. TAX REV.
371, 372-73 (2007).
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
come tax from its original class tax to the mass tax it is today. These
changes have also facilitated the exponential growth of the tax ex-
penditure budget, which is now the primary way in which the federal
government engages in non-military discretionary spending.4 And
both of these developments-the transition to a mass tax and
the growth of tax expenditures-have resulted in the federal income
tax becoming the most salient and controversial tax in the
United States.'
But while technology has certainly affected the income tax, it has
not affected its core elements. The income tax remains a self-
reported, annually calculated tax. And the tax problems resulting
from the cash economy-namely, that cash income is rarely reported
accurately-continue to plague the income tax.6 The income tax is
thus analogous to the transportation industry; while technology has
made car and plane travel more efficient and accessible to the mass-
es, the traveling experience has not changed fundamentally over the
past century. However, recent news reports suggest that driverless
cars may be available on a widespread basis within the next ten
years.' Driverless cars would fundamentally alter traffic control sys-
tems, parking, and even the way that cities are structured.s Perhaps
the same fundamental technology-driven changes are in store for the
income tax.
While technology might improve the federal income tax, it could
have the opposite effect by paving the way towards the elimination of
the income tax. One particular type of technology-payment sys-
tems-has the potential either to fortify the income tax or to destroy
it. Payment systems technology (e.g., electronic payment systems)
could eventually shrink the cash economy down to an immaterial size
and perhaps even make cash as obsolete as payphones. These devel-
opments would fortify the income tax by reducing the large part of
the "tax gap"9 attributable to unreported cash income, which would
result in increased fairness and efficiency, greater confidence in the
tax system, and improved taxpayer morale. But payment systems
technology, instead, could destroy the income tax by easing the tran-
sition from the income tax to a consumption tax.
4. See LAWRENCE ZELENAK, LEARNING TO LOVE FORM 1040: Two CHEERS FOR THE
RETURN-BASED MASS INCOME TAx 56-60 (2013) (describing the tax expenditure explosion
and its relationship to the income tax becoming a mass tax).
5. See id.
6. Susan Cleary Morse, Stewart Karlinsky & Joseph Bankman, Cash Businesses and
Tax Evasion, 20 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 37, 39-40 (2009).
7. Nick Bilton, How Driverless Cars Could Reshape Cities, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2013,
at B5.
8. See id.
9. See infra Part II (defining "cash tax gap").
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In Part II, we explain how the end of the use of cash would
strengthen the income tax system by eliminating the very large por-
tion of the tax gap that results from the inability of the Internal Rev-
enue Service to ensure that cash transactions are properly reported.
In Part III, we describe some of the advantages of a consumption tax
over the income tax that have been asserted by many economists and
policymakers. 0 We then explain how the end of cash makes the tran-
sition to that type of system more realistic. We also briefly address
some of the possible transitional and permanent concerns that such a
move would entail. In Part IV, we conclude.
II. CASH AND THE INCOME TAx GAP
A large portion of the income tax gap-the difference between the
amount of income tax revenue that is by law supposed to be paid and
the amount of income tax revenue actually collected-is attributable
to cash income that is not reported. This "cash tax gap," which has
recently been estimated at over $100 billion per year," has many
troubling policy implications. First, the lost tax revenue means that
tax rates are higher than they otherwise would need to be to raise
the same amount of revenue. The higher tax rates result in greater
tax-induced distortions, including the adoption of tax planning strat-
egies to reduce the tax burden.12 Second, the unintentional tax pref-
erence for cash transactions results in the cash economy being larger
than it otherwise would be. Businesses that routinely accept cash
(such as those that provide household and other personal services13 )
are tax-preferred relative to other businesses, which results in over-
investment in those types of businesses. In other words, the after-tax
return from cash businesses is greater because of underreporting. 14
10. DANIEL S. GOLDBERG, THE DEATH OF THE INCOME TAX: A PROGRESSIVE CONSUMP-
TION TAX AND THE PATH TO FIScAL REFORM 5 (2013) ("[A] consumption tax, that is, a tax
based on what individuals consume rather than on what they earn as under an income tax,
is viewed by most economists as superior to an income tax.").
11. See Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Presumptive Collection: A Prospect Theory Ap-
proach to Increasing Small Business Tax Compliance, 67 TAX L. REV. (forthcoming 2013)
(manuscript at 5) (on file with authors).
12. JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES 144 (4th ed. 2008) ("On all the
margins of choice, taxpayers will undertake behavior that reduces tax liability up to the
point that the marginal cost equals the marginal tax saving.").
13. For tax avoidance reasons (both income and employment taxes), homeowners
often pay domestic help in cash. Catherine B. Haskins, Household Employer Payroll Tax
Evasion: An Exploration Based on IRS Data and on Interviews with Employers and Do-
mestic Workers 5 (Feb. 1, 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Massachusetts -
Amherst), available at http://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=1171&
context=openaccessjdissertations.
14. See Thomas, supra note 11, at 5 n.21; see also U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OF-
FICE, GAO-07-1014, TAX GAP: A STRATEGY FOR REDUCING THE TAX GAP SHOULD INCLUDE
OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING SOLE PROPRIETOR NONCOMPLIANCE (2007), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071014.pdf.
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Third, to avoid detection by the IRS, taxpayers who do not report
cash income typically do not deposit the cash they receive in bank
accounts or make other investments (e.g., in stocks, bonds, or CDs)
with that cash. As a result, the cash is suboptimally invested, and
cash recipients are unable to borrow funds to grow their businesses.'5
Fourth, the cash tax gap hurts taxpayer morale and encourages other
types of tax cheating. Open and obvious cheating by failing to declare
cash income and offering "cash discounts" can make even taxpayers
who are inclined towards honest reporting doubt the integrity of
the system. 16
Fifth, the tax preference for cash encourages the use of cash over
other mediums of money payment. In fact, the tax preference for cash
probably plays a key role in the persistence of cash in the economy.
Considering the readily available alternatives to cash (debit card,
credit card, or e-payment transactions) and the problems inherent in
dealing with cash, it is a wonder that cash transactions remain as
common as they are. The problems with cash are legion.'7 Cash is
subject to counterfeit, and counterfeiters are becoming increasingly
sophisticated. Cash is more easily stolen than electronic money.'
Cash must be secured during transit and where stored. Cash must be
physically delivered to where it will be stored, resulting in transpor-
tation costs.' 9 Once a transaction in cash is consummated, it may be
impossible to find and collect against the seller if the product or ser-
vice is not delivered or is defective.2 0 Cash transactions do not spon-
taneously and immediately leave a record of what has transpired,
which allows for disputes as to whether payments have been made
and makes it more difficult for parties to keep track of what they
have purchased or sold. 21 Cash is easier for sellers' or buyers' agents
to misappropriate. Cash transactions require change to be physically
provided if exact cash is not paid, which requires sellers to keep
change on hand and slows down transactions. Cash generally must
be accounted for manually. Electronic cashiers cannot process cash
15. Morse et al., supra note 6, at 49-54; see also Ilan Benshalom, Taxing Cash, 4 COL-
UM. J. TAX L. 65, 74 (2012).
16. See Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax Gap: When
Is Information Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1733, 1755 (2010).
17. See generally DAVID WoLMAN, THE END OF MONEY (2012) (describing the prob-
lems of cash and predicting an eventual cashless society).
18. Id. at 45.
19. JACK WEATHERFORD, THE HISTORY OF MONEY 238 (1997).
20. Other payment systems make recourse against the seller much easier. Credit and
debit card companies allow buyers to challenge charges, and e-payment sellers generally
leave a footprint that would allow a claim to be made against them. Arnold S. Rosenberg,
Better than Cash? Global Proliferation of Payment Cards and Consumer Protection Policy,
44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 520, 524 (2006).
21. Id. at 534.
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transactions efficiently, which means that sellers that accept cash
usually will hire human cashiers. The list goes on and on.
This is not to say that cash does not sometimes have its virtues.
Cash is currently very useful for small, ad hoc transactions, such as
tipping service providers.2 2 But this advantage too will soon wither
away, as e-payment technologies through, for example, mobile phone
applications, become commonplace. 23 Nevertheless, there are certain
advantages of cash that will likely persist. Most significantly, cash
easily allows for anonymous purchases. 24 In addition, cognitive biases
may have a salutary effect on spending behavior when cash is used
as the medium of payment. 25 People tend to be more frugal paying in
cash rather than in other media; casinos seem to bank (no pun in-
tended) on this principle by requiring gamblers to bet with tokens.
Personal finance experts likewise encourage the use of cash to tamp
down excessive spending.26 But even this advantage may be ephem-
eral as electronic commitment devices (perhaps electric shocks from
your cell phone if you spend too much 27) eventually develop.
Overall, the benefits of non-cash payment media substantially
outweigh the benefit of cash, leaving aside tax consequences. This
explains the exponential growth of non-cash payment media and its
emerging dominance in the economy. 28 Eventually, it is likely that
nearly all remaining cash-transaction outliers will involve tax evad-
ers and crime participants.
Given the critical role of cash in tax evasion and criminal activity
more generally, it is not surprising that governments have begun to
discourage the use of cash, sometimes subtly and other times in
heavy-handed ways. Italy and Greece recently banned the use of cash
22. See Benshalom, supra note 15, at 71 (explaining that cash is "especially efficient
for small retail purchases").
23. Cf. DAVID W. SCHROPFER, THE SMARTPHONE WALLET: UNDERSTANDING THE DIs-
RUPTION AHEAD (2010) (predicting the eventual dominance of the smartphone wallet).
24. See Benshalom, supra note 15, at 92 (describing the privacy benefits of using
cash). Even the end of cash may not completely eliminate anonymous purchases. See Omri
Marian, Are Cryptocurrencies Super Tax Havens?, 112 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSION 38,
39 (2013).
25. See Benshalom, supra note 15, at 71 (noting that cash "allows some people to bet-
ter manage their personal budgets").
26. See WOLMAN, supra note 17, at 88.
27. In all seriousness, electronic devices allow users to check their balances anywhere
at any time and should also make it easier to create (and perhaps stick to) a budget.
28. Some might point to the earning of points and miles through credit/debit card use
as a reason for the emerging dominance of non-cash media. Certainly this may have been a
factor in discouraging the use of cash (because points and miles operate as an effective tax
on cash users), but the convenience and other benefits of non-cash media would outweigh
the benefits of cash, leaving aside points and miles, except in a very small subset of pur-
chasing activity.
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in transactions exceeding a threshold amount. 29 Other countries have
taken large currencies out of production, making large cash transfers
more onerous. 0 Still others have subsidized the cost of electronic
payment terminals for small retailers or provided tax rebates when a
taxpayer's electronic payments reach threshold amounts.3 '
In addition to these legal changes, some governments have en-
gaged in campaigns criticizing the use of cash in an attempt to
change social norms. For example, Britain's Treasury Minister re-
cently remarked that paying tradesmen such as plumbers in cash is
"morally wrong" because it facilitates tax evasion.3 2 Other govern-
ments have run advertising campaigns that, while not specifically tar-
geting cash transactions, emphasize the social cost of tax evasion.33
Academic commentators have argued that governments should
discourage cash transactions. 34 For example, Ilan Benshalom would
impose a Pigovian tax on cash withdrawals from financial institu-
tions to cause cash users to internalize the societal costs of tax eva-
sion and criminal activity facilitated by cash transactions.3'
As these legal and social attacks on cash proceed, technology con-
tinues to make e-payments easier, more secure, and more ubiquitous.
For example, Starbucks recently started selling the Square card
reader, which easily converts any cell phone into a credit or debit
card reader.3 6 Square and other companies have also created technol-
ogy allowing for "mobile payment" through cell phones without the
29. Joe Weisenthal, Italy is Taking a Draconian New Measure to Avoid Tax Evasion,
BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 4, 2011, 4:48 PM), http://www.businessinsider.comlitaly-banning-
cash-transactions-above-1000-euros-2011-12; Greek FinMin Unveils Tax Reform, Wage
Policy, REUTERS (Feb. 9, 2010, 11:37 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/02/09/
greece-finmin-highlights-idUSLDE61824V20100209.
30. REBECCA HELLERSTEIN & WILLIAM RYAN, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK,
STAFF REPORT NO. 400, CASH DOLLARS ABROAD 2 (rev. ed. 2011), available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff-reports/sr400.pdf.
31. See FRIEDRICH SCHNEIDER, A.T. KEARNEY, THE SHADOw ECONOMY IN EUROPE,
2011: USING ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SYSTEMS TO COMBAT THE SHADOw ECONOMY 7-8 (de-
scribing subsidies paid by Mexico, Columbia, Argentina, and South Korea for retailers who
accept electronic payments).
32. Nicholas Watt, Paying a Plumber Cash in Hand is Morally Wrong, Says Tory
Minister, THE GUARDIAN (July 23, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2012/jul/23/
taxandspending-hmrc.
33. Elisabetta Povoledo, Italy Tries to Get Tax Cheats to Pay Up, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/09/business/globallitaly-tries-to-get-tax-cheats-to-
pay-up.html.
34. See, e.g., Jay A. Soled, To Close the Tax Gap, Eliminate Cash, 115 TAX NOTES 379
(2007).
35. See generally Benshalom, supra note 15.
36. Brian X. Chen, Now on Sale at Starbucks: Square's Credit Card Reader, N.Y.
TIMES BITS BLOG (Jan. 3, 2013, 2:20 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/
03/starbucks-square-mobile-credit-card-reader/.
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use of a credit or debit card.3 ' Biometric payment, through, for exam-
ple, a touch of the finger, is also reportedly on the horizon.38
The demise of cash should have positive ramifications for the in-
come tax. E-payments automatically leave an electronic trail for eve-
ry transaction, which decreases the risk of non-reporting of income.
More importantly, e-payments must be made through a third-party
intermediary who could become subject to third-party reporting obli-
gations. The recently enacted section 6050W of the Internal Revenue
Code expanded third-party reporting obligations to credit/debit card
issuers and to "third party settlement organizations," such as PayPal,
who must now generally issue Forms 1099-K to their payees who
both receive more than $20,000 in payments in a calendar year and
engage in more than 200 transactions during the year.39 Section
6050W could easily be expanded to cover the information-reporting
regime; the $20,000/200 transaction floor could be lowered to cover
nearly all e-payment transactions.
Closing the cash tax gap would raise revenues, which could allow
for reduced rates, which would in turn reduce tax-induced behavioral
distortions. Closing the gap would also improve taxpayer morale and
confidence in the tax system by buttressing the view that everyone is
paying their fair share. Traditional cash businesses, which tend to be
smaller, more informal, and have a business-to-consumer orientation,
would no longer be tax-advantaged relative to other businesses, re-
sulting in more efficient investment decisions overall. 4 0 Second-order
problems associated with the storing of cash proceeds, such as the
suboptimal investment and borrowing activities by tax evaders,
would be alleviated. 4 '
A major drawback of this electronic utopia is that financial com-
panies will have information concerning our private as well as our
commercial activities, but society may have no choice other than to
accept that consequence. However, especially in light of recent NSA
scandals, the public may object to the government obtaining that in-
formation. 42 Of course, the government already obtains a great deal
of information (through third-party reporting), but individuals might
37. Jenna Wortham, I'm Still Waiting for My Phone to Become My Wallet, N.Y. TIMES
(July 27, 2013), www.nytimes.com/2013/07/28/technology/im-still-waiting-for-my-phone-to-
become-my-wallet.html.
38. Ellen McCarthy, Cash, Charge or Fingerprint?, WASH. POST (June 9, 2005),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/08/AR2005060802335.html.
39. See I.R.C. § 6050W.
40. Joel Slemrod, Small Business and the Tax System, in THE CRISIS IN TAX ADMIN-
ISTRATION 69, 96 (Henry J. Aaron & Joel Slemrod, eds., 2004).
41. See Benshalom, supra note 15, at 73-74.
42. See Goldberg, supra note 10, at 118.
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be unwilling to have the government know every single transaction
in which they engage.
III. WILL PAYMENT SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY EASE TRANSITION
TO A CONSUMPTION TAx?
The previous part explained that technological innovations in
payment systems should fortify the income tax by dramatically re-
ducing the income tax gap as well as cash-induced distortions. This
part considers whether those same technological innovations might
eventually doom the income tax as we know it by paving the way to-
wards a retail-sales-based consumption tax. It should be noted that it
is possible to adopt a consumption tax system and still retain an in-
come tax for high income taxpayers. A number of countries have done
that.13 However, retention of an income tax system forgoes some of
the benefits that are obtained from adopting a consumption tax as a
complete substitution for the income tax.
For a variety of reasons, many tax experts and policymakers advo-
cate for the federal tax system to transition from a (mostly) income
base to a pure consumption base.4 In addition, moving from the cur-
rent return-based system (in which taxpayers must file annual in-
come tax returns) to a retail-transaction-based system (in which re-
tailers charge and collect taxes on transactions) would probably have
political traction because of the public distaste for filing tax returns.45
One argument in favor of a consumption tax is the philosophical
one that the private withdrawal of goods and services from the econ-
omy ought to be taxed, rather than the production of goods and ser-
vices. 46 Another is that an income tax discourages saving (i.e., future
consumption) in favor of immediate consumption, while a consump-
tion tax is neutral as to the timing of consumption. 47 Yet another ar-
43. For example, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany each have both an in-
come tax and a value added tax (VAT).
44. See, e.g., EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT: How TO MAKE THE TAX SYSTEM
BETTER AND SIMPLER (2002); LAURENCE S. SEIDMAN, THE USA TAX: A PROGRESSIVE CON-
SUMPTION TAX (1997) (each proposing transition to a consumption tax).
45. See NEAL BOORTZ & JOHN LINDER, THE FAIRTAX BOOK: SAYING GOODBYE TO THE
INCOME TAX AND THE IRS 40-41 (2005) (describing public dissatisfaction with the filing of
income tax returns).
46. See, e.g., N. Gregory Mankiw, A Better Tax System (Assembly Instructions Includ-
ed), N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/22/business/four-keys-to-
a-better-tax-system-economic-view.html?_r=0.
47. To illustrate this point, Chirelstein and Zelenak use the following example. Con-
sumer (C) and Saver (S) each earn $1,000 in wages in Year 1. In a tax-free, 10% interest
world, C will consume $1,000 in Year 1, while S could consume $1,100 ($1,000 x 1.1) in
Year 2. Under a 40% consumption tax, C would consume $600 ($1,000 - 40%) in Year 1,
while S consumes $660 ($1,000 x 1.1 - 40%) in Year 2. Under a 40% income tax, C would
again consume $600 in Year 1, while S could only consume $636 ([$1,000 - 40%] + [10% x
($1,000 - 40%)]). The 1:1.1 ratio between immediate and delayed consumption holds for
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gument is that taxing income is much more difficult and complicated
than taxing consumption. The realization rule-that gains and losses
from property are generally taken into account only upon a sale or
exchange of the property-is a necessary fixture of the income tax;
yet it can be circumvented through hedging. 48 More importantly, the
realization rule creates incentives to hold onto appreciated property
(to avoid income recognition) and to dispose of depreciated property
(to trigger losses); the capital gains preference and limitations on
capital losses are responses to these incentives. 49 In addition, capital-
ization and cost recovery issues (e.g., repairs versus improvements,
capitalization and amortization of intangibles) can be immensely dif-
ficult to administer. The taxation of undistributed income of flow-
through business entities is also difficult. All of these problems would
disappear under a consumption tax.5o Under a consumption tax, real-
ization of gains or losses would be a non-event because mere realiza-
tions do not represent consumption. Likewise, the amount that a
taxpayer consumes is unaffected by whether a business expenditure
results in long-term or short-term benefit, which means that the cap-
italization doctrine would be rendered irrelevant."' And reinvested
profits of a business likewise do not result in consumption, which
means that business entity taxation would no longer be necessary.5 2
Despite the purported benefits of moving to a consumption tax
imposed on transactions, two principal obstacles are thought to be
the most significant deterrents. First, and most important, it is im-
possible, with current technology and prevailing political attitudes, to
impart much progressivity into a retail sales tax (or into its close
cousin, the VAT). Everyone must pay the same tax rate because the
the tax-free world and the consumption tax but it is reduced to 1:1.06 for the income tax.
See MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN & LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 486 (12th
ed. 2012). Note that in this example it is assumed that the tax base for both the income tax
and the consumption tax is tax-inclusive.
48. David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
1312, 1340-44 (2001).
49. David A. Weisbach, The (Non)Taxation of Risk, 58 TAX L. REV. 1 (2004).
50. This is not to say that tax complexity would altogether disappear. There still
would remain disputes about whether something represents consumption (e.g., gifts or
fringe benefits versus non-taxable perks) and valuation of in-kind consumption. See John
K. McNulty, Flat Tax, Consumption Tax, Consumption-Type Income Tax Proposals in the
United States: A Tax Policy Discussion of Fundamental Tax Reform, 88 CALIF. L. REV.
2095, 2178 (2000). But disputes falling under the "increase in net worth" side of the Haig-
Simons equation would disappear since the focus is on consumption, not on the value of
one's net worth.
51. Under a pure consumption tax, all expenditures would be immediately deductible,
thereby eliminating the need for capitalization. See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 12, at
238.
52. However, it is politically unlikely in the extreme that there would be no taxes
imposed on corporate entities. It is a virtual certainty that the corporate income tax would
be retained or would be replaced by some other tax.
2013] 167
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cash register cannot distinguish between Bill Gates and Joe the
Plumber.5 3 To alleviate those concerns, retail sales tax advocates of-
ten propose that the government pay a "prebate," which is a fixed
cash transfer to every taxpayer to offset the sales tax paid on a speci-
fied amount of consumption.5 4
A prebate would effectively create a single zero-bracket but would
not result in different marginal tax rates above the zero-bracket
amount. Thus, once a taxpayer consumes above the zero-bracket
amount, the taxpayer would be taxed at the same marginal rate re-
gardless of whether he was Joe the Plumber or Bill Gates. 5 Wide-
spread government cash disbursements also seem to be, at this point,
a political non-starter. Prebates involve the transfer of cash to every
citizen, which (it is claimed) makes voters uncomfortable 6 and has
the potential for fraud.57 "Tax coupons," which would exempt from
tax a specified amount of spending each year, would avoid the politi-
cally unattractive cash transfers, but would also impart only very
limited progressivity.5" Tax coupons would also likely face similar
fraud issues.
Another version of a consumption tax-the so-called cash-flow
tax-could easily impart a good deal of progressivity in a politically
acceptable way. The income tax could be turned into a cash-flow tax
quite easily. By allowing for unlimited individual retirement account
(IRA) contributions and also getting rid of any penalty taxes on
premature IRA distributions, only income that is consumed during
the year is taxed.59 The "consumed income" could then be subject to a
53. Another way to attempt to add progressivity is to have different rates for different
types of items (food could be taxed at a low rate while yachts could be taxed at a high rate).
This, however, is an imperfect tool and leads to administrative difficulties of how to label
certain items for tax purposes. See Catherine Rampell, Value-Added Taxes: A Primer, N.Y.
TIMES EcoNoMIx BLOG (Apr. 19, 2010, 1:38 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/
04/19/value-added-taxes-a-primer/.
54. See, e.g., BOORTZ & LINDER, supra note 45, at 84-85.
55. Note, however, that the use of a zero-bracket amount does provide some progres-
sivity to the effective tax rate applied to consumers. For example, take a consumption tax
system with a prebate amount of $1000, and a consumption tax rate of 20%. X spends
$10,000 in year one, X pays a tax of $2000 (20% times $10,000). Taking into account the
$1000 prebate, X's effective tax rate is 10%: $2000 minus the $1000 prebate, or $1000,
divided by $10,000. Y spends $20,000, and pays a tax of $4000 (20% times $20,000). Y's
effective tax rate is 15%: $4000 minus the $1000 prebate, or $3000, divided by $20,000. So,
the effective rate paid by Y is greater than the effective rate paid by X, even though the
marginal tax rates are the same.
56. Daniel N. Shaviro, Welfare, Cash Grants, and Marginal Rates, 59 SMU L. REV.
835, 839 (2006).
57. See, e.g., HANK ADLER & HUGH HEWITT, THE FAIRTAx FANTASY 46 (2009).
58. Cf. ZELENAK, supra note 4, at 76-77 (describing a 1943 proposal by Treasury Sec-
retary Henry Morgenthau, Jr. for a national sales tax combined with tax coupons to impart
progressivity).
59. See McCAFFREY, supra note 44, at 57-58; SEIDMAN, supra note 44, at 6-7.
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progressive tax rate schedule, so that as the taxpayer's consumption
increases during the year, the consumption is taxed at higher rates.60
This method of taxing consumption would probably be palatable to
the public, as it would superficially look very much like the current
income tax. On the other hand, a cash-flow tax would still require
taxpayers to file annual returns,6' which would take away the
attractiveness of the proposal for those who wish to do away with
individual returns.
Futuristic "smart" e-payment systems could be able to track how
much every taxpayer spends each year and to adjust the rate of tax
(as calculated and collected by the retailer or by an e-payment mid-
dleman) as the taxpayer's spending increases. Thus, for example, the
first $10,000 of consumption spending could be tax free, with the next
$10,000 taxable at a 5% rate, the next $10,000 at a 10% rate, and so
on. To avoid liquidity issues for both taxpayers and the government,
the amount of tax paid on a particular transaction would be a blend-
ed rate based on estimated annual consumption, and true-up adjust-
ments would be made towards the end of the year if actual consump-
tion during the year differed from projected consumption. 62 However,
one problem with that approach is that it is vulnerable to tax evasion
by the simple scheme of having purchases made for someone by a
person with low consumption.6 3
A second obstacle to moving to a consumption tax is the transition
problem. Money already taxed under the outgoing income tax, as rep-
resented by the taxpayer's aggregate basis in her assets or cash on
hand, should not be taxed again under the new consumption tax.64
Absent any transition relief, under any of the consumption tax sys-
tems-retail sales tax, VAT, and cash-flow tax-double taxation of
pre-enactment basis would result. 65 While there are ways to mitigate
60. See MCCAFFREY, supra note 44, at 57-58; SEIDMAN, supra note 44, at 6-7.
61. See MCCAFFREY, supra note 44, at 57.
62. For example, assume that a taxpayer, based on her prior year's consumption (or
income, if this is the first year of the consumption tax), is expected to spend $100,000 on
consumption, which would (after taking account of any exemption amount) be taxed at an
effective rate of 20%. At the beginning of the year, the tax would be imposed at that 20%. If
the taxpayer's spending during the year is less than expected, such that the expected effec-
tive tax rate is now 15%, the tax rate on future purchases would be adjusted. After the end
of the year, when the proper tax rate is known with precision, a refund would be issued to
the taxpayer for any excess tax paid. This system is much like the wage withholding sys-
tem we have today.
63. Of course, if cash is completely eliminated, then the government should be able to
track transactions between the evaders.
64. See MCCAFFERY, supra note 44, at 108-10 (discussing transition problem of pre-
enactment basis).
65. While it is easy to see how double taxation would result under retail sales tax and
VAT, double taxation may be harder to see under the cash-flow model, but it nevertheless
exists there too. Under the cash-flow model, taxpayers would be required to put all of their
investment assets into their IRA, and distributions therefrom would subsequently be taxed
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the transition burden on existing wealth even under current technol-
ogy, smart e-payment systems would make it easier to provide tran-
sition relief. Smart e-payment systems could take account of the tax-
payer's basis and cash at the time of transition and allow for that
amount to purchase tax-free consumption to the extent legislators
determine transition relief is warranted. The amount of such exclu-
sion from the consumption tax could be amortized over the anticipat-
ed consumption of the taxpayer during the taxpayer's life expectancy.
Payment systems technology could make a progressive retail sales
tax that includes such transition relief for pre-enactment basis a re-
alistic possibility. E-payment technology would allow third-party in-
termediaries (or, more rarely, retailers) to adjust the tax rate im-
posed on purchases to take account of both the taxpayer's consump-
tion level and the taxpayer's previously taxed assets. The technology
could also allow a taxpayer's pre-enactment basis to be amortized
against future consumption, preventing or at least ameliorating the
double taxation problem.
As a political matter, a progressive retail sales tax would have a
number of benefits to make it attractive. It would remove the incon-
venience of taxpayers having to file annual tax returns, which is
something that voters claim to hate. 66 Because the tax would be paid
in small increments, like traditional retail sales taxes imposed by
states, it would be less salient than the current income tax. 67 And the
tax would be progressive without requiring the government to make
direct wealth transfers to its citizens.
Once the requisite technology is eventually developed, the major
impediment to implementing a progressive retail sales tax would
probably be privacy concerns. To impose the correct tax rate at the
point of retail sale, the third-party intermediary (or, perhaps, the re-
tail seller) would need to know the amount of the buyer's previous
consumption. This could be troubling to some people, though they
might be comforted by the fact that machines, not people, will be ag-
gregating and processing the consumption data. Unfortunately, we
have seen that people can farm information out of the machines that
collect it.68 We also must keep in mind that attitudes towards privacy
regardless of whether the distributions represent amounts previously taxed under the
former income tax, thereby resulting in double taxation.
66. A Third of Americans Say They Like Doing Their Income Taxes, PEW RESEARCH
CTR. (Apr. 11, 2013), http://www.people-press.org/2013/04/11/a-third-of-americans-say-
they-like-doing-their-income-taxes/.
67. The salience of the income tax is reduced by the withholding mechanism. Howev-
er, since taxpayers must file an income tax return each year, they will see their ultimate
tax bill even if they do not have to pay it all at once.
68. Amir M. Hormozi & Stacy Giles, Data Mining: A Competitive Weapon for Banking
and Retail Industries, INFO. SYs. MGMT., Spring 2004, at 62, 69.
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and technology will certainly evolve as we inevitably move towards a
paperless society. For example, the idea of electronic stock registra-
tion (in lieu of physical shares) would surely have been a non-starter
over much of the stock market's history, yet physical shares are now
nearly obsolete. And the information now voluntarily shared by Fa-
cebook users would have been considered extremely private in years
past.69 So while current prevailing attitudes towards privacy might
preclude the enactment of a progressive retail sales tax now, it is
quite possible that privacy concerns will eventually diminish to the
point where such a tax is politically feasible.
Privacy concerns might also ensure that at least some cash trans-
actions will continue to occur. People who place a high value on
anonymous purchasing may continue to use cash." Other people
might choose to use cash only when they are making purchases that
they consider particularly private or sensitive. The persistence of
cash transactions would pose a problem for a progressive retail sales
tax. Ideally, the same amount of tax ought to be imposed whether
payments are made in cash or electronically. But only electronic
payments can be tracked, and such tracking is necessary in order to
determine the correct tax rate. It seems to us that the best solution
would be to impose the highest statutory tax rate on cash purchases
and require the retail seller to collect the tax. This would treat all
cash purchases as if persons with large amounts of consumption
made them. In many cases, this would overtax cash purchases and,
in effect, act as a penalty on anonymous purchasing. This would be
an unintended by-product of a progressive retail sales tax, but given
the expected evolution in attitudes regarding privacy, it is possible that
this penalty might not impede the eventual enactment of such a tax.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this Symposium Essay, we have argued that technological in-
novation will be critical during the next 100 years of the income tax.
On the one hand, the increasing prevalence of electronic payment
systems should bolster the income tax by substantially reducing the
tax gap and mitigating the distortions caused by the cash economy.
On the other hand, technological innovation and the corresponding
evolution of attitudes towards privacy could make a progressive
retail sales tax quite feasible, which might spell the end of the
income tax.
69. Natasha Singer, Your Online Attention, Bought in an Instant, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/18/technology/your-online-attention-bought-in-
an-instant-by-advertisers.html?pagewanted=1&_r=O.
70. Even without cash, anonymous electronic currencies, such as bit coins, may be
available. See Marian, supra note 24, at 39.
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